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ABSTRACT 
Remanufacturing is one of the product recovery processes which transforms used-product 
into “like-new” condition. It could extend the product’s useful life and could help reducing 
huge amount of short life-cycle products’ wastes. Pricing decision is an important aspect of 
successful remanufacturing which would secure the firm’s profitability. However, the 
uncertainty in materials recovered from product returns is one among the complicating 
characteristics. Unlike remanufacturing for consumer returns and business-to-business 
(B2B) returns, remanufacturing for end-of-use products needs to cope with high 
uncertainties in quality and quantity of the acquired product returns. Therefore, after 
inspection, only a fraction of returns can be recovered through remanufacturing operation. 
Random yield of product returns also influences the decisions in acquisition, wholesale, and 
retail prices. We propose a pricing model that accommodate the effect of random yield of 
product returns to the pricing decisions for short life-cycle products in a closed-loop supply 
chain, under random demand.The system consists of a retailer, a manufacturer, and a 
collector of used-product under multi-period setting. Demand functions are random, time-
dependent, and price-sensitive; both for new and remanufactured products. Yield of product 
return is random with known probability density function and cumulative distribution 
function. Sequential decision approach is undertaken to find the optimum pricing decision 
that maximize the supply chain profit, with pricing game that puts manufacturer as a 
Stackelberg leader. The results indicated that remanufacturing cost, manufacturer’s shortage 
penalty, and yield factor randomness influence the pricing decisions. 
 
Keywords: remanufacturing, pricing, short life-cycle product, yield of product return, 
sequential approach 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the recent development, product life cycle is getting shorter and shorter, especially for 
technology-based product. Couple with the increasing obsolescence in function and desirability, 
the short life cycle products has created a huge amount of wastes. Remanufacturing is one of the 
product recovery processes which transforms used-product into “like-new” condition. It could 
extend the product’s useful life and could help reducing wastes. There are three motives for 
performing remanufacturing that often used in literature, i.e. ethical and moral responsibility, 
regulation, and profitability (Seitz, 2007). The first motive is relatively weak compared to the 
others, as stated earlier in Ferrer & Guide (2002).The second motive relies on government 
regulation which may not apply to some countries or states. The importance of profitability is also 
supported by Guide et al. (2003), Guide et al. (2005), Atasu et al. (2008),andLund & Hauser 
(2009). There are three key activities in reverse supply chain, namely product return management, 
remanufacturing operations issues, and market development of remanufactured product, as pointed 
out by Guide & Wassenhove (2009). They find that business perspective including pricing, which 
is part of market development activity, is an area that needs to be explored further.  
Pricing decision is an important aspect of successful remanufacturing which would secure 
the firm’s profitability. Atasu et al. (2010)find that remanufacturing does not always cannibalize 
the sales of new products. Managers, who understand the composition of their markets and use the 
proper pricing strategy, should be able to create additional profit. In a similar manner, Souza 
(2013) points out that introducing remanufactured product to the market alongside with the new 
product has two implications, i.e. market expansion effect and cannibalization effect; which makes 
pricing of the two products is critical. Therefore, pricing decision for both new and 
remanufactured product is an important task in an effort to gain economic benefit from 
remanufacturing practices. 
There are numerous study on pricing remanufactured products for profit maximization, 
such as Ferrer & Swaminathan (2006), Atasu et al. (2008), Ovchinnikov (2011),that search for 
optimal price and quantity under deterministic setting. However, unlike remanufacturing for 
consumer returns and business-to-business (B2B) returns, remanufacturing for end-of-use 
products needs to cope with high uncertainties in quality, quantity and timing of the acquired 
product returns. After collected used products are inspected, only a fraction of returns can be 
recovered through remanufacturing operation. This uncertainty could influence pricing decision. 
We propose a pricing model that accommodate the effect of random yield of product 
returns to the pricing decisions for short life-cycle products in a closed-loop supply chain.A 
random yield variable is introduced, which represents the fraction of returns that are 
remanufacturable. We consider a closed-loop supply chain that consists of manufacturer, retailer 
and collector in a pricing game under Stackelberg leadership with manufacturer as the leader. The 
purpose of this study is finding the optimum wholesale price, retail price, acquisition price and the 
relevant quantities so that supply chain profit is maximized. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The importance of pricing strategy in a closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing has 
been explored in several studies (Guide & Wassenhove (2009), Atasu et al. (2010), andSouza 
(2013)).These thoughts seem to be responded with increasing studies in pricing decision for 
remanufacturing practices, whether from the perspective of one member of a supply chain or from 
the perspective of several key members in the supply chain.  
Several pricing decision studies from remanufacturer’s point of view are mainly focused 
on optimal acquisition price of the used product and selling price of the remanufactured product 
6th International Conference on Operations and Supply Chain Management, Bali, 2014 
 
572 
 
(Guide et al. (2003), Bakal & Akcali (2006), Liang et al. (2009), Li et al. (2009)), where 
remanufacturer performs both collection and remanufacturing process. Guide et al. (2003) claim 
that product recovery management is the primary driver to determine the profitability of reuse 
activities.They develop a model to determine selling price of remanufactured products and 
acquisition prices for each quality classes of returns, which maximize manufacturer’s profit. Liang 
et al. (2009) address the problem in collecting used products, where there is a random fluctuation 
in remanufactured products’ price, while remanufacturer needs to offer a certain core price to 
attract customers in returning products. Assuming selling price of remanufactured products follow 
Geometric Brownian Motion, they propose a model to evaluate acquisition price of cores, and also 
use option principles to further determine selling price. The remanufactured products’ price varies 
with market sentiment, thus exhibits the nature of stocks; and the core price shows the 
characteristics of options.In the other studies, rather than focusing on the effect of acquisition 
price to quantity and quality of product returns, these studiesfocus on the effect of random 
recovery yield.Bakal & Akcali (2006) develop a pricing model to determine acquisition and 
selling price that maximize profit, where supply of used products and demand of remanufactured 
parts are deterministic and price-sensitive. They also investigate the effect of random recovery 
yield by setting different timing for price decision. Recovery yield refers to fraction of parts that 
are remanufacturable, and can be influenced by used products’ acquisition price. The first setting 
is taking selling price decision after recovery yield is known, and second is taking pricing decision 
prior to realization of recovery yield, hence simultaneously determining acquisition and selling 
prices. Later, Li et al. (2009) not only consider the effect of random yield, but also random 
demand. They propose an optimization model using two-step stochastic dynamic programming. 
First they find optimal selling price to maximize expected revenue, and then find collection price 
that maximize the utility of the firm. This study is further extended in(Li et al. 2014), where two 
typical sequential decision strategies are explored, i.e. First-Remanufacturing-Then-Pricing 
(FRTP) and First-Pricing-Then-Remanufacturing (FPTR), hence these optimization models search 
not only for remanufactured product’s selling price, but also remanufacturing quantity, under 
random yield and random demand. 
There are several approaches used in the literature for dealing with random yield. 
Mukhopadhyay & Ma (2009) study the effect of random yield rate by comparing three cases, i.e. 
deterministic yield rate, random yield rate with order placed before and after the actual yield is 
observed. Ferguson et al. (2009)propose the use of grading system to tackle the uncertainty in 
return quantity and uncertainty in demand for remanufactured products. They develop a model 
under capacitated remanufacturing facilities for remanufacturing where returns have various 
quality levels. Teunter & Flapper (2011)consider multiple quality classes and multinomial quality 
distribution for acquired lot, and find that it is necessary to acquire additional used products as 
safety stock to avoid cost error.Robotis et al. (2012)consider random quality of returns as the 
source of uncertainty in remanufacturing cost, and propose an inspection environment setting 
based on the firm's ability to perform reliable inspection of used products. Qiang et al. 
(2013)provide a finite dimensional variational inequality problem as the governing equilibrium 
condition in the existence of stochastic demand and returns yield rate.  
Pricing models within a supply chain that involves several members of the supply chainare 
also discussed in several studies. Qiaolun et al. (2008) consider a supply chain consists of 
manufacturer, retailer and collector, who involved in selling new products, collecting cores, 
remanufacturing and reselling the recovered products. Manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader, and 
determines the wholesale price, and then retailer and collector decide on the retail price as well as 
acquisition price of used products. Return rate is influenced by end-customer’s willingness, and 
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willingness is affected by collecting price.Wei &Zhao (2011), considering fuzziness in customer 
demands, remanufacturing cost, and collecting cost in a closed-loop supply chain, use game theory 
and fuzzy theory to find optimal wholesale price, retail price and remanufacturing rate. The model 
is explored under two scenarios, namely centralized and decentralized decision scenarios.Wu 
(2012a) use game theory to investigate OEM’s product design strategy and remanufacturer’s 
pricing strategy. OEM considers level of interchangeability in its product design, and need to find 
the optimal level, since increasing level of interchangeability would lower OEM production cost 
but also lower remanufacturer’s cost in cannibalizing OEM’s product. Remanufacturer evaluates 
its pricing strategy, either low or high pricing. Demand for new and remanufactured products are 
both linear and sensitive to price.Wu (2012b), similar to Wu (2012a), apply game theory to find 
equilibrium decisions in determining prices of new and remanufactured products, and the degree 
of disassemblability of OEM’s product design. OEM is at risk of price competition with 
remanufacturer because when degree of disassemblability is high, it would reduce OEM 
production cost but also reduce remanufacturer’s recovery cost in cannibalizing OEM’s new 
product. The model is constructed for two period problem as well as multi-period. Demands for 
new and remanufactured products are both linear and price-sensitive.The above studies are 
considering deterministic or fuzzy demand, and do not consider randomness in demand function. 
Recently, Jena & Sarmah (2013) study the optimal acquisition price management in a 
remanufacturing system, considering three schemes of collection, i.e. direct, indirect and 
coordinated collection. The model involves remanufacturer and retailer, and aims at finding 
optimum core price that maximize profit in a single period. This study considers random demand, 
but only for remanufactured product. It is our goal to study pricing decision with random demand 
for both new and remanufactured products within a closed-loop supply chain. 
Our study focus on random yield of product return and random demand, and we consider 
all key members of the closed-loop supply chain, namely manufacturer, retailer, and collector. 
Therefore, we consider both new and remanufactured product, and pricing decisions of the above 
mentioned members. Sequential decision approach is used in this study to find the optimal prices. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In section 3 we provide a description of the problem that 
includes the process flow, variables involved, demand pattern and functions definition, and the 
decision flows. The development of optimization model for each of the three key members in the 
closed-loop supply chain is discussed in section 4. In section 5, we provide numerical example and 
discuss several factors that are important to the pricing decisions, andconclusions are presented in 
section 6. 
 
3. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
A closed-loop supply chain consists of three members, which are manufacturer, retailer, 
and collector, as depicted in Figure 1. The closed-loop is initiated by production of new product, 
which is sold at a wholesale price ௡ܲ௪to the retaileraccording to her order quantity	ݍ௡. The new 
product is then released to the market at a retail price	 ௡ܲ.After a certain period of time, some 
products reach their end-of-use and become the objects of used products collection. The used 
product would be acquired by collector under a certain acquisition price,	 ௖ܲ, with a quantity of 	ݍ௖. 
Collector performs inspection, sorting, and cleaning under a random yield factor	ߛ. The portion of 
collected products, that areremanufacturable,are then transferred to manufacturer at a price	 ௙ܲ, 
asthe input for remanufacturing process. The quantity of remanufactured product made by 
manufacturer depends on the retailer’s order quantity, as well as the availability of the 
remanufacturable items. The remanufactured product is sold to retailer at wholesale price	 ௥ܲ௪ and 
released to the market at retail price	 ௥ܲ. 
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Figure 1. Framework of the closed-loop pricing model with random yield 
 
The product considered in this model is single item, short life-cycle, with obsolescence 
effect after a certain period, in term of obsolescence in function and desirability. Demands are 
random, with time-dependent functions which represent the short life-cycle pattern along the 
entire phases of product life-cycle, both for new and remanufactured products; and linear in price. 
There are four time frames considered in this model, as depicted in Figure 2. In the first 
interval [0, t1], only new product is offered to the market. In second and third interval,i.e. [t1, ] 
and[, t3], both new and remanufactured products are offered. The difference between second and 
third interval is on the segments of life-cycle phases for both types. During second interval, both 
new and remanufactured products are at the IMG phases.In the third interval, the new product has 
entered the decline phase while remanufactured product has not. In the fourth interval [t3, T], 
manufacturer has stopped producing new product and only offers remanufactured product which is 
assumed to be on the decline phase. 
The market demand capacity is adopted from (Wang & Tung 2011) and extended to cover 
the obsolescence period, where demand decreases significantly. The demand patterns are 
constructed for both new and remanufactured product and the governing functions are formulated 
as follows:  
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where dn(t) and dr(t) are demand pattern for new and remanufactured products, respectively, as 
seen in Figure 2. U is a parameter representing the maximum possible demand for new product,  
is the time when the demand reaches its peak, i.e. at U level. d0 is the demand at the beginning of 
the life-cycle (when t = 0), and λ is the speed of change in the demand as a function of time. A 
parallel definition is applicable for V, t3, dr0, and η respectively for the remanufactured products. It 
is obvious that dn(t) and dr(t) are continuous at  and t3, respectively. 
Since demand of new and remanufactured products are random and both depend on the 
price of new product as well as the price of remanufactured product, the demand functions can be 
expressed as 
ܦ௡( ௡ܲ , ௥ܲ , ݐ) = ݀௡(ݐ)(1 − ܽ ௡ܲ + ܾ ௥ܲ) ∙ ߙ ………………………………………(3.3) 
ܦ௥( ௡ܲ , ௥ܲ , ݐ) = ݀௥(ݐ)(1 − ܿ ௡ܲ + ݀ ௥ܲ) ∙ ߚ ………………………………………(3.4) 
where ߙ and ߚ are random variables with density functions f(x) and g(x), and cumulative 
distribution function F(x) and G(x), respectively. We assume that ߙ and ߚ are independent and 
each has finite support [0,1]. Random variable can take additive or multiplicative form, and in this 
study we use multiplicative form as it nicely fits the demand representation and for convenience in 
the analytical modeling. 
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Figure 2. Demand pattern of a product with gradual obsolescence, over time 
 
The demand function information is shared to all members of the supply chain. The pricing 
game mechanism is started with manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader releasing wholesale 
prices. This information is used by retailer, along with observation to the market demand, to 
decide the optimal retail prices as well as the order quantities. Collector, on the other hand, 
observes the demand of remanufactured product and decides the optimal acquisition price, while 
considering the random yield factor. The remanufacturable acquired products are then transferred 
to the manufacturer, who further decides the wholesale prices for both new and remanufactured 
products. 
 
4. OPTIMIZATION  
4.1 Retailer’s optimization 
Manufacturer makes the first move by releasing initial wholesale prices ௡ܲ௪ and ௥ܲ௪. 
Retailer then optimizes the retail prices under sequential approach: 
Optim1:  max௉೙,௉ೝ Πோ൫( ௡ܲ , ௥ܲ)|(ݍோ௡∗ ,ݍோ௥∗ )൯ = ݍோ௡∗ ( ௡ܲ − ௡ܲ௪) + ݍோ௥∗ ( ௥ܲ − ௥ܲ௪) ………………(4.1) 
    where (ݍோ௡∗ ,ݍோ௥∗ ) is the solution of Optim2 
Optim2a:max௤೙ ,௤ೝ Πோ൫(ݍ௡ ,ݍ௥)|( ௡ܲ , ௥ܲ)൯ = max௤೙,௤ೝ൛ܧఈ[ ௡ܲ ∙ min(ܫ௡(ߙ),ݍ௡)] +
ܧఉ[ ௥ܲ ∙ min(ܫ௥(ߚ),ݍ௥)] − ݍ௡ ௡ܲ௪ − ݍ௥ ௥ܲ௪ൟ  
 ………………(4.2) 
               where ܫ௡(ߙ) is the total demand over [0,ݐଷ] for new products, a function of random 
variable ߙ; andܫ௥(ߚ) is the total demand over [ݐଵ,T] for remanufactured products, a 
function of random variable ߚ. 
Therefore, 
ܫ௡(ߙ) = ∫ ௎ଵା௞௘షഊೆ೟ఓ଴ (1 − ܽ ௡ܲ + ܾ ௥ܲ) ∙ ߙ	݀ݐ + ∫ ௎ఒ௎(௧ିఓ)ାఋ௧యఓ (1 − ܽ ௡ܲ + ܾ ௥ܲ) ∙ ߙ݀ݐ =
݀ଵଶ(1 − ܽ ௡ܲ + ܾ ௥ܲ) ∙ ߙ    ……………………………………… 
(4.3) 
ܫ௥(ߚ) = ∫ ௏ଵା௛௘షആೇ(೟ష೟భ)௧య௧భ (1 − ܿ ௥ܲ + ݁ ௡ܲ) ∙ ߚ	݀ݐ + ∫ ௏ఎ௏(௧ି௧య)ାఌ்௧య (1 − ܿ ௥ܲ + ݁ ௡ܲ) ∙ ߚ݀ݐ =
݀ଷସ(1 − ܿ ௥ܲ + ݁ ௡ܲ) ∙ ߚ  ……………………………………… (4.4) 
where 
݀ଵଶ = ଵఒ ݈݊ ቀ ఋ(ଵା௞)௘షഊೆഋቁ ቀఒ௎(௧యିఓ)ାఋఋ ቁ  ……………………………………… (4.5) 
݀ଷସ = ଵఎ ݈݊ ቀ ఌ(ଵା௛)௘షആೇ(೟యష೟భ)ቁ ቀఎ௏(்ି௧య)ାఌఌ ቁ ……………………………………… (4.6) 
 
At somegiven prices ௡ܲ and ௥ܲ, the expected quantities that maximize profit can be found 
by first letting ݖ = ௤೙
ௗభమ(ଵି௔௉೙ା௕௉ೝ) , which is the value of random variable ߙ when ܫ௡(ߙ) = ݍ௡; 
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andݓ = ௤ೝ
ௗయర(ଵି௖௉ೝା௘௉೙) , the value of random variable ߚ when ܫ௥(ߚ) = ݍ௥; these are similar to the 
stocking factor proposed by Li et al. (2009). 
ܧఈ[ ௡ܲ ∙ min(ܫ௡(ߙ),ݍ௡)] = ௡ܲ ∙ ܧఈ[min(ܫ௡(ߙ),ݍ௡)]= ௡ܲ ∙ ቄ∫ ܫ௡(ݔ)݂(ݔ)݀ݔ + ∫ ݍ௡݂(ݔ)݀ݔଵ௭௭଴ ቅ =
௡ܲ ∙ ൛∫ ܫ௡(ݔ)݂(ݔ)݀ݔ + ݍ௡ܨത(ݖ)௭଴ ൟ 
Similarly, ܧఉ[ ௥ܲ ∙ min(ܫ௥(ߚ),ݍ௥)] = ௥ܲ ∙ ൛∫ ܫ௥(ݔ)݃(ݔ)݀ݔ + ݍ௥̅ܩ(ݓ)௪଴ ൟ 
where ܨത(ݔ) = 1 − ܨ(ݔ) and ̅ܩ(ݔ) = 1 − ܩ(ݔ) 
The optimization problem becomes 
Optim2b: max௤೙ ,௤ೝ Πோ = max௤೙,,௤ೝ ൣ ௡ܲ ∙ ൛∫ ܫ௡(ݔ)݂(ݔ)݀ݔ + ݍ௡ܨത(ݖ)௭଴ ൟ − ݍ௡ ௡ܲ௪ + ௥ܲ ∙
൛∫ ܫ௥(ݔ)݃(ݔ)݀ݔ + ݍ௥̅ܩ(ݓ)௪଴ ൟ − ݍ௥ ௥ܲ௪൧ 
 ……………………………………… (4.7) 
Since ௗ௭
ௗ௤೙
= ଵ
ௗభమ(ଵି௔௉೙ା௕௉ೝ)  andௗ௪ௗ௤ೝ = ଵௗయర(ଵି௖௉ೝା௘௉೙) , then 
డΠೃ
డ௤೙
= ௡ܲ ∙ ቀௗభమ(ଵି௔௉೙ା௕௉ೝ)௭௙(௭)ௗభమ(ଵି௔௉೙ା௕௉ೝ) + ܨത(ݖ) − ௤೙௙(௭)ௗభమ(ଵି௔௉೙ା௕௉ೝ)ቁ − ௡ܲ௪ = 0 ……… (4.8) 
డΠೃ
డ௤ೝ
= ௥ܲ ∙ ቀௗయర(ଵି௖௉ೝା௘௉೙)௪௚(௪)ௗయర(ଵି௖௉ೝା௘௉೙) + ̅ܩ(ݓ) − ௤ೝ௚(௪)ௗయర(ଵି௖௉ೝା௘௉೙)ቁ − ௥ܲ௪ = 0 ……… (4.9) 
Simplifying the equations, we find 
 ௡ܲܨത ቀ
௤೙
ௗభమ(ଵି௔௉೙ା௕௉ೝ)ቁ = ௡ܲ௪    ……………………………………… (4.10) 
 ௥ܲ̅ܩ ቀ
௤ೝ
ௗయర(ଵି௖௉ೝା௘௉೙)ቁ = ௥ܲ௪   ……………………………………… (4.11) 
so the optimal quantities are ݍோ௡∗ , ݍோ௥∗  where 
 ݍோ௡∗ = ݀ଵଶ(1 − ܽ ௡ܲ + ܾ ௥ܲ)ܨതିଵ ቀ௉೙ೢ௉೙ ቁ ……………………………………… (4.12) 
 ݍோ௥∗ = ݀ଷସ(1 − ܿ ௥ܲ + ݁ ௡ܲ)̅ܩିଵ ቀ௉ೝೢ௉ೝ ቁ  ……………………………………… (4.13) 
Now we find optimal prices by solving Optim1 max௉೙,௉ೝ Πோ൫( ௡ܲ , ௥ܲ)|(ݍோ௡∗ ,ݍோ௥∗ )൯ = ݀ଵଶ(1 − ܽ ௡ܲ + ܾ ௥ܲ)ܨതିଵ ቀ௉೙ೢ௉೙ ቁ ( ௡ܲ − ௡ܲ௪) 	+ ݀ଷସ(1 − ܿ ௥ܲ +
݁ ௡ܲ)̅ܩିଵ ቀ௉ೝೢ௉ೝ ቁ ( ௥ܲ − ௥ܲ௪)  ……………………… (4.14) 
డΠೃ
డ௉೙
=
݀ଵଶ(1 − 2ܽ ௡ܲ + ܾ ௥ܲ + ܽ ௡ܲ௪)ܨതିଵ ቀ௉೙ೢ௉೙ ቁ +
݀ଵଶ(1 − ܽ ௡ܲ + ܾ ௥ܲ)( ௡ܲ − ௡ܲ௪) ௗௗ௉೙ ቆܨതିଵ ቀ௉೙ೢ௉೙ ቁቇ+ 	݁	݀ଷସ̅ܩିଵ ቀ௉ೝೢ௉ೝ ቁ ( ௥ܲ − ௥ܲ௪) = 0
 ……………………… (4.15) 
డΠೃ
డ௉ೝ
= ݀ଷସ(1 − 2ܿ ௥ܲ + ݁ ௡ܲ + ܿ ௥ܲ௪)̅ܩିଵ ቀ௉ೝೢ௉ೝ ቁ +
݀ଷସ(1 − ܿ ௥ܲ + ݁ ௡ܲ)( ௥ܲ − ௥ܲ௪) ௗௗ௉ೝ ቆ̅ܩିଵ ቀ௉ೝೢ௉ೝ ቁቇ + ܾ	݀ଵଶܨതିଵ ቀ௉೙ೢ௉೙ ቁ ( ௡ܲ − ௡ܲ௪) = 0
 ……………………… (4.16) 
 The optimal retail prices are ௡ܲ∗ and ௥ܲ∗ that solves (4.15) and (4.16) for ௡ܲand 
௥ܲsimultaneously. However, it is difficult to provide closed form solutions for the optimal prices, 
so we use computational approachand leave the analysis to the numerical study. 
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4.2  Collector’s Optimization 
The collector problem is significantly influenced by the random yield factor,since only a 
portion (ߛ)of returned used product meets the input requirements to the remanufacturing process. 
The quantity of returns, ݍ௖, is influenced by acquisition price, ௖ܲ; which approach has been used in 
several studies such asQiaolun et al. (2008)andLi et al. (2009). Collector performs inspection and 
sorting tothe acquired returns, and transfers the remanufacturable items to the manufacturer at a 
transfer price ௙ܲ. Returns that do not meet the quality requirement are disposed. Since the collector 
decides on collected quantity before random yield factor is realized, the quantity of 
remanufacturable items can be higher or lower than the manufacturer’s order quantity	(ݍ௥). 
Therefore, shortage penalty(݊௖)and salvage value(ݒ) are applied to the model. Yield factor ߛ is a 
random variable with density function ℎ(ݔ) and cumulative distribution function	ܪ(ݔ). 
The governing equation for collection quantity as a function of collection price is given as 
ݍ௖ = Θ( ௖ܲ) = ߮ ௖ܲఏݍ௡,   ……………………………… (4.17) 
similar to the return rate used inQiaolun et al. (2008), where߮is a positive constant coefficient and 
ߠ[0,1] is the exponent of thepower function, which determine the curve’s steepness. 
The collector’s optimization problem can be expressed as  
Optim3a: max௤೎ Π஼(ݍ௖) = ௙ܲ ∙ ܧఊ[min(ݍ௥ ,ݍ௖ߛ) − ݊௖[ݍ௥ − ݍ௖ߛ]ା + ݒ[ݍ௖ߛ − ݍ௥]ା] − ݍ௖( ௖ܲ + ܿ௢) 
      ……………………………………………… (4.18) 
Let	ݖ = ௤ೝ
௤೎
 , which represents the value of ߛ when	ݍ௖ߛ = ݍ௥; and replace ௖ܲ with ቀ ௤೎ఝ௤೙ቁଵ ఏൗ  
according to the collection function, optimization problem Optim3 becomes max௤೎ Π஼(ݍ௖) = ൫ ௙ܲ + ݊௖ − ݒ൯ ∫ (ݍ௖ 	ݔ − ݍ௥)ℎ(ݔ)݀ݔ + ൫ ௙ܲ − ݒ൯ݍ௥௭଴ + ݒݍ௖ 	ܧ(ߛ) −
ݍ௖ ቆቀ
௤೎
ఝ௤೙
ቁ
ଵ
ఏൗ + ܿ௢ቇ ……………………………………………… (4.19) 
Applying the first derivative condition, we find 
ௗΠ಴
ௗ௤೎
= ൫ ௙ܲ + ݊௖ − ݒ൯ ቂ(ݍ௖ 	ݖ	 − ݍ௥)ℎ(ݖ) ௗ௭ௗ௤೎ + ∫ ݔ	ℎ(ݔ)	݀ݔ௭଴ ቃ+ ݒ	ܧ(ߛ) − ቀ1 + ଵఏቁ ቀ ௤೎ఝ௤೙ቁభഇ −
ܿ௢ = 0   ……………………………………………… (4.20) 
Since ݍ௥ = ݖݍ௖   and   ௗ௭ௗ௤೎ = − ௤ೝ௤೎మ, 
൫ ௙ܲ + ݊௖ − ݒ൯ ∫ ݔ	ℎ(ݔ)	݀ݔ௤ೝ ௤೎ൗ଴ + ݒ	ܧ(ߛ) − ቀ1 + ଵఏቁ ቀ ௤೎ఝ௤೙ቁభഇ − ܿ௢ = 0 ……… (4.21) 
The optimal collection quantityis ݍ௖∗ that satisfies equation (4.21)and ௖ܲ
∗ = ቀ ௤೎∗
ఝ௤೙
ቁ
ଵ
ఏൗ . 
 These optimums depends on yield factor randomness, parameters in collection function, 
order quantity of remanufactured product, transfer price and shortage penalty as well as salvage 
value. 
 
4.2  Manufacturer’ Optimization 
In this stage, manufacturer observes retailer’s prices and order quantities, as well as 
collector’s supplied quantity of the remanufacturable items, after the random yield factor is 
realized. Therefore, manufacturer is not always able to meet the retailer’s order quantity for 
remanufactured product, as it would depend on the ability of the collector to meet this quantity. 
Consequently, there is a shortage penalty imposed to increase the level of order fulfillment. The 
optimization problem is 
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Optim4a: max௉೙ೢ,௉ೝೢ Πெ = ݍ௡( ௡ܲ௪ − ܿ௥௪ − ܿ௠) + ܧఊൣmin(ݍ௥ ,ݍ௖ߛ) ∙	൫ ௥ܲ௪ − ௙ܲ − ܿ௥൯ −
݊௠[ݍ௥ − ݍ௖ߛ]ା൧ ……………………………………………… (4.22) 
where ܿ௥௪ and ܿ௠ are unit raw material cost and unit manufacturing cost for new product,  while 
ܿ௥ is remanufacturing cost and ݊௠ is unit shortage penalty. 
Since retailer’s optimal quantities are given as in (4.12) and (4.13), the optimization problem 
becomes 
Optim4b: max௉೙ೢ,௉ೝೢ Πெ = ݀ଵଶ(1 − ܽ ௡ܲ + ܾ ௥ܲ)ܨതିଵ ቀ௉೙ೢ௉೙ ቁ ( ௡ܲ௪ − ܿ௥௪ − ܿ௠) +
ܧఊ ൤min ቀ݀ଷସ(1 − ௥ܲ + ݁ ௡ܲ)̅ܩିଵ ቀ௉ೝೢ௉ೝ ቁ , ݍ௖ߛቁ ∙	൫ ௥ܲ௪ − ௙ܲ − ܿ௥൯ −
݊௠ ቂ݀ଷସ(1 − ܿ ௥ܲ + ݁ ௡ܲ)̅ܩିଵ ቀ௉ೝೢ௉ೝ ቁ − ݍ௖ߛቃା൨
 ……………………………………… (4.23) 
Let ݑ = ݀ଵଶ(1 − ܽ ௡ܲ + ܾ ௥ܲ), ݈ = ݀ଷସ(1 − ܿ ௥ܲ + ݁ ௡ܲ); Φ(ݔ) = ܨതିଵ(ݔ), and Ψ(ݔ) = ̅ܩିଵ(ݔ) with  
their first derivativesΦ′(ݔ) = ௗ
ௗ௫
൫ܨതିଵ(ݔ)൯ and Ψ′(ݔ) = ௗ
ௗ௫
൫̅ܩିଵ(ݔ)൯. 
Also, let = ௗయర(ଵି௖௉ೝା௘௉೙)ீ̅షభቀುೝೢುೝ ቁ
௤೎
= 	 ௟Ψቀುೝೢುೝ ቁ
௤೎
 , which represents the value of random yield factor ߛ 
when	ݍ௖ߛ = ݍ௥. Therefore, the optimization problem can be expressed as follow 
Optim4c: max௉೙ೢ,௉ೝೢ Πெ = ݑ	Φ ቀ௉೙ೢ௉೙ ቁ ( ௡ܲ௪ − ܿ௥௪ − ܿ௠) + 	ݍ௖ 	ݖ	൫ ௥ܲ௪ − ௙ܲ − ܿ௥൯ +
	൫ ௥ܲ௪ − ௙ܲ − ܿ௥ + ݊௠൯	ݍ௖ ∫ (ݔ − ݖ) (ݔ)݀ݔ௭଴  ……………… (4.24) 
 Since ݖ is a function of ௥ܲ௪, taking first derivative to ௥ܲ௪ can be done by applying chain rule, with 
ௗ௭
ௗ௉ೝೢ
= ௟ஏᇲቀುೝೢುೝ ቁ
௤೎
ଵ
௉ೝ
. Therefore, the first derivative conditions are 
(1) డஈಾ
డ௉೙ೢ
= Φᇱ ቀ௉೙ೢ
௉೙
ቁ ( ௡ܲ௪ − ܿ௥௪ − ܿ௠) + 	Φ ቀ௉೙ೢ௉೙ ቁ = 0   ……………… (4.25) 
(2) డஈಾ
డ௉ೝೢ
= 	ݍ௖൫ ௥ܲ௪ − ௙ܲ − ܿ௥൯ ௗ௭ௗ௉ೝೢ + 	ݍ௖ 	ݖ + 	ݍ௖ ∫ (ݔ − ݖ)ℎ(ݔ)݀ݔ௭଴ + ൫ ௥ܲ௪ − ௙ܲ − ܿ௥ +
݊௠൯	ݍ௖
ௗ
ௗ௭
ൣ∫ (ݔ − ݖ)ℎ(ݔ)݀ݔ௭଴ ൧ ௗ௭ௗ௉ೝೢ = 0 ……………………………… (4.26) 
which can be simplified into 1ܲ
௥
݈	Ψᇱ ൬ ௥ܲ௪
௥ܲ
൰ ൣ൫ ௥ܲ௪ − ௙ܲ − ܿ௥൯ܪഥ(ݖ) + ݊௠ܪ(ݖ)൧ + 	ݍ௖ ቆݖ + න (ݔ − ݖ)ℎ(ݔ)݀ݔ௭
଴
ቇ= 0 
     ……………………………………………… (4.27) 
The optimal wholesale prices are ௡ܲ௪∗  that satisfies (4.25) and ௥ܲ௪∗  that satisfies (4.27).  
The optimal wholesale price for new product depends on retailer’s price, raw material and 
manufacturing unit costs, and cumulative distribution function of random variable governing the 
randomness of new product’s demand function. It is interesting that even though demand of new 
product depends on retail price of remanufactured product, but the optimal wholesale price does 
not depend on any parameter in the remanufacturing process flow. As for the optimal wholesale 
price for remanufactured product, in addition to the parallel factors as in new product’s optimal 
wholesale price; quantity of collection, yield factor randomness, and penalty factor are also 
affecting the optimum, as well as new product’s retail price. Since it is difficult to obtain closed-
form solutions, we will use numerical approach to study the effects of several important factors. 
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5. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
The pricing decision problem in this numerical example involves the following parameters: 
price sensitiveness for demands of new and remanufactured product ܽ = 	0.003,ܾ = 	0.0001,ܿ =0,004, ݁ = 	0,0002. The demand capacity of new product contains parameters ܷ, ݀଴, ߣ  such that 
݀ଵଶ = 	4000, while demand capacity of remanufactured product has parameters ܸ,݀௥଴, ߟ such that 
݀ଷସ = 	1500. The unit raw material cost for new product ܿ௥௪ = 	50, unit manufacturing cost 
ܿ௠ = 40, unit remanufacturing cost ܿ௥ = 	20, and unit collecting cost ܿ଴ = 	4. Parameters in the 
return rate function are ߮ = 	0.1 and ߠ = 	0.7. Collector’s shortage penalty and salvage value are 
݊௖ = 5and ݒ = 8 respectively. Manufacturer’s shortage penalty is ݊௠ = 50. Transfer price is 
௙ܲ = 40. The initial wholesale prices releases by manufacturer are ௡ܲ௪ = 120 and ௥ܲ௪ = 80, for 
new and remanufactured product.ߙ,ߚ,ߛ are random variables with uniform distribution on finite 
support [0,1]. 
 
Table 1. Effects of remanufacturing cost 
 ࢉ࢘ New Reman Profit 
Manufacturer  
 
ܿ௥ = 30 ௡ܲ௪ =171.09 ௥ܲ௪ =150.93 32,458.81 Retailer ௡ܲ =252.19    ௥ܲ =190.44      30,267.95 Collector  ௖ܲ = 8.26 
ݍ௖ = 241.20 1,207.78 
Quantity ݍ௡ =337.62    ݍ௥ =73.11      Total: 63,934.54 
Manufacturer  
 
ܿ௥ = 20 ௡ܲ௪ =171.09 ௥ܲ௪ =148.46      33,207.42 Retailer ௡ܲ =252.19    ௥ܲ =190.44      30,592.69 Collector  ௖ܲ = 8.26 
ݍ௖ = 241.20 1,207.78 
Quantity ݍ௡ =337.62    ݍ௥ =76.56      Total: 65,007.89 
Manufacturer  
 
ܿ௥ = 10 ௡ܲ௪ =171.09 ௥ܲ௪ =146.12      33,989.07 Retailer ௡ܲ =252.19    ௥ܲ =190.44      30,912.68 Collector  ௖ܲ = 8.26 
ݍ௖ = 241.20 1,207.78 
Quantity ݍ௡ =337.62    ݍ௥ =79.73      Total: 66,109.53 
Manufacturer  
 
ܿ௥ = 5 ௡ܲ௪ =171.09 ௥ܲ௪ =144.99 34,391.43 Retailer ௡ܲ =252.19    ௥ܲ =190.44      31,070.33 Collector  ௖ܲ = 8.26 
ݍ௖ = 241.20 1,207.78 
Quantity ݍ௡ =337.62    ݍ௥ =81.21      Total: 66,669.54 
 
Table 2. Effects of manufacturer’s shortage penalty 
 ࢉ࢘ New Reman Profit 
Manufacturer  
 
݊௠ = 70 ௡ܲ௪ =171.09 ௥ܲ௪ =151.35      32,855.83 Retailer ௡ܲ =252.19    ௥ܲ =190.44      30,213.35 Collector  ௖ܲ = 8.26 
ݍ௖ = 241.20 1,207.78 
Quantity ݍ௡ =337.62    ݍ௥ =72.51      Total: 64,276.96 
Manufacturer  
 
݊௠ = 50 ௡ܲ௪ =171.09 ௥ܲ௪ =148.46      33,207.42 Retailer ௡ܲ =252.19    ௥ܲ =190.44      30,592.69 Collector  ௖ܲ = 8.26 
ݍ௖ = 241.20 1,207.78 
Quantity ݍ௡ =337.62    ݍ௥ =76.56      Total: 65,007.89 
Manufacturer  
 
݊௠ = 30 ௡ܲ௪ =171.09 ௥ܲ௪ =144.99      33,616.15 Retailer ௡ܲ =252.19    ௥ܲ =190.44      31,070.17 Collector  ௖ܲ = 8.26 1,207.78 
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ݍ௖ = 241.20 
Quantity ݍ௡ =337.62    ݍ௥ =81.21      Total: 65,894.10 
Manufacturer  
 
݊௠ = 10 ௡ܲ௪ =171.09 ௥ܲ௪ =140.65      3,4391.43 Retailer ௡ܲ =252.19    ௥ܲ =190.44      31,692.54 Collector  ௖ܲ = 8.26 
ݍ௖ = 241.20 1,207.78 
Quantity ݍ௡ =337.62    ݍ௥ =86.64      Total: 67,001.09 
 
The optimization problems are solved using Matlab. Then, we perform sensitivity analysis 
for several factors that are important to the pricing decision, which are unit remanufacturing cost, 
manufacturer’s shortage penalty, and the parameters of random yield. We use uniform distribution 
for random variables in the demand functions as well as the yield factor. The results are shown in 
Tables 1 – 4. 
Table 1 shows that an increase in remanufacturing cost would lower the profit of retailer 
and manufacturer, while the collector’s profit is not affected by it. Remanufacturing cost does not 
affect retailer’s and collector’s pricing decision, as expected from the analytical model, but it 
affects the wholesale price of remanufactured product. As remanufacturing cost increases, 
manufacturer responds to it by increasing the wholesale price instead of the decreasing effect in 
the quantity.Therefore, both retailer and manufacturer get lower profit, even though 
manufacturer’s profit drops twice as fast as retailer’s. 
 
Table 3. Effects of the mean value of the random yield 
 
 ࢽ~ࢁ[࡭,࡮] New Reman Profit 
Manufacturer  
 
U[0.1,0.7] 
௡ܲ௪ =175.84    ௥ܲ௪ =152.77      26,685.70 
Retailer ௡ܲ =251.69    ௥ܲ =193.43      25,601.45 
Collector  ௖ܲ =6.01      
ݍ௖ =194.07      801.20 
Quantity ݍ௡ =318.56    ݍ௥ =35.44      Total: 53,088.36 
Manufacturer  
 
U[0.2,0.8] 
௡ܲ௪ =175.84    ௥ܲ௪ =152.50 26,702.54 
Retailer ௡ܲ =251.69    ௥ܲ =193.43      25,623.28 
Collector  ௖ܲ =6.14      
ݍ௖ =197.12      957.67 
Quantity ݍ௡ =318.56    ݍ௥ =35.75      Total: 53,283.49 
Manufacturer  
 
U[0.3,0.9] 
௡ܲ௪ =175.84    ௥ܲ௪ =152.50      26,719.45 
Retailer ௡ܲ =251.69    ௥ܲ =193.43      25,645.37 
Collector  ௖ܲ =6.14      
ݍ௖ =197.12      1,116.61 
Quantity ݍ௡ =318.56    ݍ௥ =36.06      Total: 53,481.43 
 
Table 4. Effects of variance in the random yield 
 
 ࢽ~ࢁ[࡭,࡮] New Reman Profit 
Manufacturer  
 
U[0.2,0.8] 
௡ܲ௪ =175.84    ௥ܲ௪ =152.50      26,702.54 
Retailer ௡ܲ =251.69    ௥ܲ =193.43      25,623.28 
Collector  ௖ܲ =6.14    
ݍ௖ =197.12      957.67 
Quantity ݍ௡ =318.56    ݍ௥ =35.75      Total: 53,283.49 
Manufacturer  
 
௡ܲ௪ =175.84    ௥ܲ௪ =149.23      26,914.92 
Retailer ௡ܲ =251.69    ௥ܲ =193.43      25,913.33 
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Collector U[0.1,0.9]  ௖ܲ =5.45    
ݍ௖ =181.25      1,723.15 
Quantity ݍ௡ =318.56    ݍ௥ =39.66      Total: 54,551.40 
Manufacturer  
 
U[0,1] 
௡ܲ௪ =175.84    ௥ܲ௪ =146.94      27,067.62 
Retailer ௡ܲ =251.69    ௥ܲ =193.43      26,138.30 
Collector  ௖ܲ =4.97    
ݍ௖ =203.44      2,218.29 
Quantity ݍ௡ =318.56    ݍ௥ =42.55      Total: 55,424.21 
 
Similarly, as shown in Table 2, when manufacturer’s shortage penalty increases, retailer’s 
and manufacturer’s profit decrease, while collector’s profit is again not affected. Manufacturer 
reacts by increasing the wholesale price of remanufactured product to cover the risk of receiving 
shortage penalty, and in turns decreasing the quantity of remanufactured product. While both 
manufacturer and retailer hurts by receiving lower profit, this time retailer’s profit drops slightly 
faster than manufacturer’s. 
The shift in mean value of random yield influence the profit received by all three parties in 
positive direction as given in Table 3. As the expected value of random yield gets higher, there 
would be a bigger portion of collected used products that meet remanufacturing requirement. 
Hence, the probability to supply lower than the order quantity decreases, and total quantity of 
remanufactured product increases. Collection price also increases to increase the collection 
quantity, as a respond to higher order quantity of remanufactured product. All members’ profits 
increase as the expected value for random yield increases as a result of order fulfillment and less 
penalties. Collector’s percentage profit increase is significantly higher than the others because 
yield factor of product returns is harbored in collector’s inspection and sorting process.Similar 
argument applies for the variance of random yield, as shown in Table 4.It is interesting that an 
increase in variance of random yield is responded by lowering wholesale price and collection 
price, and this actions increase the remanufactured product’s quantity which in turn increase the 
supply chain profit. However, the decrease in wholesale and collection prices as the variance of 
random yield gets higher, is more notable than that in mean value’s effect. We find that wholesale 
price of remanufactured product and collection price are more robust to a shift in mean value of 
random yield rather than a change in random yield’s variance. 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
 Pricing decision problem in a closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing under 
random yield and random demand is an important problem that needs to be addressed because it 
significantly affects profitability. Unlike many previous studies that consider one member of the 
supply chain, we develop a model that involves three key members of the supply chain, namely 
manufacturer, retailer and collector; for a short life cycle product. 
 The results show that remanufacturing cost and manufacturer’s shortage penalty influence 
the wholesale price of the remanufactured product and further has impact on the retailer’s and 
manufacturer’s profit. A decrease in remanufacturing cost and manufacturer’s shortage penalty 
increase the total profit. On the other hand the mean value and variance of random yield has 
positive effect in the supply chain’s profit, as the higher the mean value and the variance, the 
higher the profit of each of the member.We also find that wholesale price of remanufactured 
product is more robust to a shift in mean value of random yield rather than a change in random 
yield’s variance. 
 
6. REFERENCES 
6th International Conference on Operations and Supply Chain Management, Bali, 2014 
 
582 
 
Atasu, A., Guide, V.D.R.J. & Wassenhove, L.N. Van, 2010. So what if remanufacturing cannibalizes my 
new product sales? California Management Review, 52(2), pp.56–76.  
Atasu, A., Sarvary, M. & Wassenhove, L.N. Van, 2008. Remanufacturing as a marketing strategy. 
Management Science, 54(10), pp.1731–1746. 
Bakal, I.S. & Akcali, E., 2006. Effects of Random Yield in Remanufacturing with Price-Sensitive Supply 
and Demand. Production and Operations Management, 15(3), pp.407–420. 
Ferguson, M.E. et al., 2009. The Value of Quality Grading in Remanufacturing. Production and Operations 
Management, 18(3), pp.300–314. 
Ferrer, G. & Guide, V.D.R.J., 2002. Remanufacturing cases and state of the art. In R. U. Ayres & L. W. 
Ayres, eds. A handbook of industrial ecology. Chelten-ham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 510–520. 
Ferrer, G. & Swaminathan, J.M., 2006. Managing New and Remanufactured Products. Management 
Science, 52(1), pp.15–26. 
Guide, V.D.R.J., Muyldermans, L. & Wassenhove, L.N. Van, 2005. Hewlett-Packard Company Unlocks 
the Value Potential from Time-Sensitive Returns. Interfaces, 35(4), pp.281–293. 
Guide, V.D.R.J., Teunter, R.H. & Wassenhove, L.N. Van, 2003. Matching Demand and Supply to 
Maximize Profits from Remanufacturing. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 5(4), 
pp.303–316. 
Guide, V.D.R.J. & Wassenhove, L.N. Van, 2009. The Evolution of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Research. 
Operations Research, 57(1), pp.10–18.  
Jena, S.K. & Sarmah, S.P., 2013. Optimal acquisition price management in a remanufacturing system. 
International Journal of Sustainable Engineering. 
Li, X., Li, Y. & Cai, X., 2009. Collection Pricing Decision in a Remanufacturing System Considering 
Random Yield and Random Demand. Systems Engineering - Theory & Practice, 29(8), pp.19–27.  
Li, X., Li, Y. & Cai, X., 2014. Remanufacturing and pricing decisions with random yield and random 
demand. Computers & Operations Research, pp.1–9. Available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2014.01.005. 
Liang, Y., Pokharel, S. & Lim, G.H., 2009. Pricing used products for remanufacturing. European Journal 
of Operational Research, 193(2), pp.390–395.  
Lund, R.T. & Hauser, W.M., 2009. Remanufacturing – An American Perspective, 
Mukhopadhyay, S.K. & Ma, H., 2009. Joint procurement and production decisions in remanufacturing 
under quality and demand uncertainty. International Journal of Production Economics, 120(1), pp.5–
17.  
Ovchinnikov, A., 2011. Revenue and Cost Management for Remanufactured Products. Production and 
Operations Management, 20(6), pp.824–840. 
Qiang, Q. et al., 2013. The closed-loop supply chain network with competition, distribution channel 
investment, and uncertainties. Omega, 41(2), pp.186–194.  
Qiaolun, G., Jianhua, J. & Tiegang, G., 2008. Pricing management for a closed-loop supply chain. Journal 
of Revenue and Pricing Management, 7(1), pp.45–60. 
Robotis, A., Boyaci, T. & Verter, V., 2012. Investing in reusability of products of uncertain 
remanufacturing cost: The role of inspection capabilities. International Journal of Production 
Economics, 140(1), pp.385–395.  
Seitz, M.A., 2007. A critical assessment of motives for product recovery: the case of engine 
remanufacturing. Journal of Cleaner Production, 15, pp.1147–1157. 
Souza, G.C., 2013. Closed-Loop Supply Chains: A Critical Review, and Future Research. Decision 
Sciences, 44(1), pp.7–38.  
Teunter, R.H. & Flapper, S.D.P., 2011. Optimal core acquisition and remanufacturing policies under 
uncertain core quality fractions. European Journal of Operational Research, 210, pp.241–248.  
Wang, K.-H. & Tung, C.-T., 2011. Construction of a model towards EOQ and pricing strategy for 
gradually obsolescent products. Applied Mathematics and Computation, 217(16), pp.6926–6933.  
Wei, J. & Zhao, J., 2011. Pricing decisions with retail competition in a fuzzy closed-loop supply chain. 
Expert Systems With Applications, 38(9), pp.11209–11216.  
6th International Conference on Operations and Supply Chain Management, Bali, 2014 
 
583 
 
Wu, C.-H., 2013. OEM product design in a price competition with remanufactured product. Omega, 41, 
pp.287–298.  
Wu, C.-H., 2012. Product-design and pricing strategies with remanufacturing. European Journal of 
Operational Research, 222(2), pp.204–215.  
 
